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Terrorizing Immigrants in the
Name of Fighting Terrorism
By David Cole

It

the first casualties of war. It may be
is often
said that
civilthat
liberties
are
more
accurate
to say
immigrants'
civil liberties are the first to go. In the
wake of the devastating terrorist attacks
of September 11, we all feel vulnerable
in ways that we have never felt before,
and many have argued that we may
need to sacrifice our liberty in order to
purchase security. In fact, however, what
we have done is to sacrifice the liberties
of some-immigrants, and especially
Arab and Muslim immigrants-for the
purported security of the rest of us. This
double standard is an all too tempting
way to strike the balance-it allows citizens to enjoy a sense of security without
sacrificing their own liberty but it is an
illegitimate trade-off. In the end, moreover, it is likely to be counterproductive,
as it will alienate the very communities
that we most need to work with as we
fight the war on terrorism.
Our response to September I1 has
been all too familiar. Just as we have
done in other times of crisis, we have
substituted broad-brush guilt by association for targeted measures directed at
specific guilty conduct, and have circumvented procedures designed to
identify the guilty while protecting the
innocent. Congress has made immigrants deportable for their political associations and excludable for pure speech,
and subject to indefinite detention on
the basis of an executive official's certification. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
has launched a massive preventive
detention project, detaining over 500
immigrants on routine immigration
charges, in connection with the investigation of the attacks of September 11.
These immigrants are being tried in
secret proceedings, in cases that are not
even listed on the docket. And the DOI
has given Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) prosecutors
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in removal cases the authority to keep
immigrants detained even after an immigration judge has ordered their release.
In this and other ways, we have sacrificed basic commitments to equality by
trading a minority group's liberty for the
majority's purported security.

History
This is hardly the first time that we have
responded to fear by targeting immigrants
and treating them as suspect because of
their group identities rather than their
individual conduct. In World War I, we
imprisoned dissidents, most of them
immigrants, for merely speaking out
against the war. In 1919, the federal government responded to a politically motivated bombing of Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer's home in Washington,
D.C., by rounding up 6,000 (and eventually deporting 556) suspected immigrants
in thirty-three cities across the countrynot for their part in the bombings, but for
their political affiliations.
In World War II, we interned over
110,000 persons, again many of whom

were immigrants, not because of individualized determinations that they posed a
threat to national security or the war
effort, but solely for their Japanese
ancestry. And in the fight against
Communism, which reached its height
in the McCarthy era, we made it a crime
even to be a member of the Communist
Party, and passed the McCarran-Walter
Act, which authorized the government
to keep out and expel noncitizens who
advocated Communism or other proscribed ideas, or who belonged to the
Communist Party or other groups that
advocated proscribed ideas.
While today's response does not yet
match these historical overreactions, it is
characterized by some of the same mistakes of principle-targeting vulnerable
groups not for illegal conduct but for
group identity or political affiliation, treating legitimate political activity as if it were
a criminal offense, and bypassing measures designed to protect the innocent.

Guilt by Association
The problems begin with the USA Patriot
Act (Patriot Act), enacted in haste under
threats from Attorney General John
Ashcroft that if another terrorist incident
occurred before the law was signed,
Congress would be held responsible.
Among other things, it imposes guilt by
association on immigrants, a philosophy
that the Supreme Court has condemned
as "alien to the traditions of a free society
and the First Amendment itself." Before
the advent of the Patriot Act, aliens were
deportable for engaging in or supporting
terrorist activity. The Patriot Act makes
them deportable for virtually any associational activity with a "terrorist organization," irrespective of whether the alien's
support has any connection to an act of
violence, much less terrorism. And
because the Act defines "terrorist activity" to include virtually any use or threat
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to use a weapon against a person or
property, and defines a "terrorist organization" as any group of two or more persons that engages in such an act, the proscription on political association potentially encompasses every organization
that has ever been involved in a civil war
or a crime of violence, from a pro-life
group that once threatened workers at an
abortion clinic, to the ANC, the IRA, or
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
Once a group is designated as a "terrorist group," aliens are deportable for asking people to join it, fundraising for it, or
providing any kind of material support to
it, including dues. Indeed, the law extends
even to those who support a group in an
effort to counter terrorism. Thus, an immigrant who offered his services in peace
negotiating to the IRA in the hope of furthering the peace process in Great Britain
could be deported as a terrorist.
This is guilt by association, because it
treats aliens as culpable not for their own
acts, but for the acts of those with whom
their conduct is associated. Guilt by association, the Supreme Court has ruled, violates the First and Fifth Amendments. All
people in the United States have a First
Amendment right to associate with groups
that have lawful and unlawful ends, so
long as they do not further the group's
illegal ends. And the Fifth Amendment
dictates that "in our jurisprudence guilt is
The
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Ideological Exclusion
The Patriot Act also resurrects ideological exclusion, the practice of denying
entry to aliens for pure speech. It
excludes aliens who "endorse or
espouse terrorist activity," or who "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization," in ways
that the secretary of state determines
undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. It also excludes aliens who are
representatives of groups that "endorse
acts of terrorist activity" in ways that
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personal." Without some connection
between the alien's support and terrorist
activity, the Constitution is violated.
Some argue that the threat from terrorist organizations abroad requires
compromise on the principle prohibiting
guilt by association. But this constitutional principle was developed in connection with measures directed at the
Communist Party, an organization that
Congress found to be a foreign-dominated organization that used sabotage and
terrorism for the purpose of overthrowing the United States by force and violence, and that was supported by the
world's other great superpower.
Others argue that money is fungible,
so support of a group's lawful activities
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will simply free up resources that will be
spent on terrorism. But that argument
proves too much, for it would authorize
guilt by association whenever any organization engages in some illegal activity.
Donations to the Democratic Party, it
could be argued, "free up" resources that
are used to violate campaign finance
laws, yet surely we could not criminalize
all support to the Democratic Party simply because it sometimes violates the
campaign finance laws. Moreover, the
fungibility argument assumes that every
marginal dollar provided to a designated
group will, in fact, be spent on violence.
However, no one would seriously contend that every dollar given to the ANC
for its lawful anti-apartheid work freed
up a dollar that was spent on that organization's terrorist activity.

similarly undermine U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism.
Excluding people for their ideas is
flatly contrary to the spirit of freedom for
which the United States stands. It was
for that reason that Congress repealed
all such grounds in the Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1990, after years of
embarrassing politically motivated visa
denials. We are a strong enough country, and our resolve against terrorism is
powerful enough, to make such censorship wholly unnecessary.
Detention versus Due Process
The government has detained well over
1,200 persons in connection with the
investigation of the attacks of September

11. (The DOJ has halted its practice of
publicizing the total number detained
so we don't know how much higher the
actual figure may be.) As of December
2001, over 500 persons were still being
held in federal custody, with an untold
number of others being held in state
and local custody. Yet, as of that same
time, only one person had been
charged with involvement in the crimes
perpetrated that day-Zaccarias
Moussaoui. Department of Justice officials claim that about ten or twelve of
the detained may be linked to Al
Qaeda, but of course that only raises a
question about the rest. The DOJ has
been unwilling to disclose even the
most basic information about the largest
group of detainees, those held on immigration charges. It refuses even to identify who is detained. The immigrants are
being tried in secret proceedings, closed
to the public, the press, or even family
members. Immigration judges are
instructed not to list the cases on the
docket, and to refuse to confirm or deny
that cases even exist. Such practices are
unprecedented. But what we do know,
mostly from enterprising investigative
journalists, suggests that the vast majority have all but the most attenuated connections to the events of that terrible
day. Most of those detained appear to
be Arabs or Muslims.
The administration has dramatically
changed the rules governing its authority to detain immigrants. Shortly after
September 11, the INS unilaterally
amended a regulation governing detention without charges. The regulation had
required the INS to file charges within
twenty-four hours of detaining an alien;
under the new regulations, detention
without charges is permissible for fortyeight hours, and for an unspecified "reasonable" period beyond forty-eight
hours in times of emergency.
Before September 11, the INS could
detain any alien placed in removal proceedings for as long as the proceedings
lasted-in many cases several years.
However, it could do so only ifit had reason to believe that he or she posed a
threat to national security or a risk of
flight, and the alien was entitled to seek
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release from an immigration judge. Under
a new regulation, however, even if the
immigration judge rules that the alien
should be released, INS prosecutors can
keep him locked up simply by filing an
appeal of the release order. They need not
make any showing that their appeal is
likely to succeed. Appeals of immigration
custody decisions routinely take months
and often more than a year to decide.
The Patriot Act goes still further, giving
the attorney general unilateral authority to
detain aliens on his say-so, without any
opportunity for the alien to respond to the
charges. The attorney general may detain
any immigrant whom he certifies as a "suspected terrorist." The Patriot Act defines a
"suspected terrorist" so broadly that it
includes virtually every immigrant who has
been involved in a barroom brawl or
domestic dispute, as well as aliens who
have never committed an act of violence in
their life, and whose only crime is that he
or she provided humanitarian aid to an
organization disfavored by the government.
This provision raises several basic constitutional concerns. It mandates preventive detention of persons who pose no
threat to national security or risk of flight,
and without any hearing. And it allows
the INS to detain such aliens indefinitely,
even where they prevail in their removal
proceedings. This is akin to detaining a
prisoner even after he has been pardoned.
The provision permits certification and
detention on mere "reasonable grounds to
believe" that an alien has engaged in terrorist activity, a standard that the INS has
likened to the "reasonable suspicion"
required for a brief stop and frisk under
the Fourth Amendment. But under the
Fourth Amendment, "reasonable suspicion" does not even justify a custodial
arrest, much less indefinite detention.
The provision also permits detention
for up to seven days without filing any
charges. Yet, the Supreme Court has
ruled in the criminal setting that charges
must be filed within forty-eight hours
except in the most extraordinary circumstances. In short, hundreds of immigrants not charged with any crime,
much less involvement in the September
11 attack, are being detained in secret,
even where judges rule that there is no
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basis for detention, and without going
before a judge at all.

Military Justice
In November 2001, President Bush issued
an unprecedented military order that
authorizes dispensing with criminal trials
and trying all aliens accused of terrorist
acts or harboring terrorists in military tribunals. In such tribunals, the defendant
would have none of the rights that attach
to a criminal trial. The trial could be held
in secret, classified information could be
Immirans ar
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used against the defendant without affording him an opportunity to confront or
rebut it, the rules of evidence would not
apply, there would be no jury, a conviction would require only a two-thirds vote
of the military officers who presided, there
would be no appeal to a court, and the
penalty could include execution. In
essence, the executive branch-and
specifically the military-would become
judge, jury, and executioner. (The
Department of Defense is developing regulations that may provide some protections, but those regulations had not been
issued at the time of this writing.)
Military tribunals are not unprecedented in wartime, and they have been
upheld as a means to try enemies for
offenses against the laws of war. Even if
one could argue that we are in a de
facto war with Al Qaeda, the tribunal's
jurisdiction is not limited to members of
that group, but extends to any noncitizen accused of engaging in international
terrorism or harboring persons so
engaged, irrespective of whether the
individual is linked in any way to the
attacks of September 11, or the group
that perpetrated those attacks.
Noncitizens put on trial here for criminal offenses are entitled to all the same
rights as U.S. citizens, including the right
to a public trial, to a trial by jury, to confront the evidence against them, to discover exculpatory evidence and suppress
illegally seized evidence, and to the assistance of counsel. These paramount rights
are not limited to citizens, but attach to
every criminal trial, because only such

safeguards ensure that we protect the
innocent while convicting the guilty. We
have tried thousands of noncitizens under
these principles, for terrorism, espionage,
sabotage, and subversion. The president
has made no showing that wholesale
abandonment of that practice is either
necessary or authorized.
Interestingly, the decision to limit the
jurisdiction of the military tribunals to
noncitizens appears to have been purely
political. In 1942, the Supreme Court held
that in wartime, military tribunals could
dtaied
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be used to try citizens as well as noncitizens, as long as they were fighting for the
enemy. Thus, there is no constitutional
justification for the limitation, and it
appears to be a purely pragmatic political
calculus-namely, that the American people would be less likely to object if someone else's liberties are threatened. One
official is reported to have said that the
administration didn't think it would be fair
to subject citizens to such tribunals. But
the fairness of the procedures does not
vary with the identity of the defendants.
Here, too, we seem all too willing to sacrifice their rights for our security.
Finally, there is good reason to doubt
whether these measures will in fact
make us safer. By penalizing even wholly lawful, nonviolent, and counter-terrorist associational activity, we are likely to
waste valuable resources tracking innocent political activity, drive other activity
underground, encourage extremists, and
make the communities that will
inevitably be targeted by such measures
far less likely to cooperate with law
enforcement. And by conducting law
enforcement in secret, and jettisoning
procedures designed to protect the innocent and afford legitimacy to the outcome of trials, we will encourage peopIe to fear the worst about our government. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote
nearly seventy-five years ago, the
framers of our Constitution knew "that
fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; and that hate menaces stacontinued on page 22
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individual proof, Congress found it necessary to enact a blanket punishment."
Thus, whether Mr. Bajakajian had been
taking $357,1 t4 out of the country or
$3 million, it would all have been subject to forfeiture. For what? For failing to
till out the U.S. Customs form.
Under the new law, of course, the
government will be able to "adduce
affirmative proof of another crime"-bulk cash smuggling. The only question
is whether the Court will see through this
ruse. The question it should ask is not
whether this change in the law will give
the government a useful tool in the war
on crime--it will in those relatively few
cases in which real criminals are
caught--but whether that tool is consistent with the Eighth Amendment's prohi-

bition of excessive fines. After all, not
everyone seeking to quietly transport his
own currency in or out of the country is
a terrorist. There are many tools that
would be useful inthe war on crime and
terrorism but not all are constitutional.

Alien Justice

tion now preaches must lead it to overcome its objections to the ICC and join
with its allies in supporting this important
new institution. When the gavel comes
down at the start of the ICC's first trial of
an international terrorist, U.S. opposition
will likely start to come down too.
Of course, the international options
for trying terrorist suspects are riot liriited to the ICC. Some experts have suggested expanding the jurisdiction of the
Yugoslav war crimes tribunal to include
terrorist offenses and war crimes committed in Afghanistan. Others suggest
that the UN Security Council establish a
new tribunal to try Al Qaeda members.
Additional alternatives include some
type of hybrid, Lockerbie-style court, or
military trials conducted iii jurisdictions
outside the United States.
Although each of these options carries its own set of complications, none
would require us to forsake our cherished institutions of justice. The military

continued rot page 15
ural choice to try such enemies of civilization as bin Laden and his associates.
Although the court has not yet come into
existence, and its jurisdiction is prospective only, the requisite sixty ratifications
likely will be obtained in a few months.
Many international legal experts, including the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, have concluded that the
September 11 attacks constitute "criiies
against humanity," a central feature of the
ICC's jurisdiction. Though it could not try
the perpetrators of these attacks, the
events of September 11 make clear the
importance of getting the ICC up and
running as soon as possible. The closest
U.S. allies in the current military effortincluding the United Kingdom, which
ratified the ICC treaty in the midst of
offering the U.S. its support in the war on
terror-believe that the ICC represents
the future of international justice in the
new millennium. Yet, the United States
continues to spurn it, even in the aftermath of our national tragedy signaling
support of a bill sponsored by Senator
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that would prevent
the ICC from ever coming into existence.
Ultimately, however; the hard-headed
multilateralism that the Bush administra-
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Conclusion
The irony of this is that the two measures discussed in this article, had they
been in place on September 11, probably would have done little or nothing to
protect us against the terrorist attacks. To
the best of our knowledge, none of the
terrorists committed a crime in or
against a foreign country. Thus, no property they owned in this country would
have been subject to seizure or forfeiture. Likewise, it does not appear that

Fighting Terrorism
continued from page 13
ble government." In other words, freedoni and security need not necessarily
be traded off against one another; maintaining our freedoms is itself critical to
maintaining our security.

any of them was engaged in bulk cash
smuggling. Given the low probability of
being detected in light of the number of
people and packages that pass through
U.S. Custorns every clay, this measure
will hardly drive terrorists either to
report or transfer funds through channels that report. What these measures
will do, however, is cost domestic and
foreign financial institutions huge sLIms
of money in record keeping expenses
and reporting, while ensnaring, along
with a few of the guilty, a good number
of perfectly innocent people. That's no
way to fight terrorism.
Roger Pilon is vice president for legal
affairs at the Cato Institute and director of
Cato's Center for Constitutional Studies.

commissions authorized by the president's order have no place in a country
committed to protecting liberty through
the rule of law and separation of powers. The United States stands for these
principles internationally, and will be
judged by how well it cleaves to them in
this time of crisis.
On November 13, President Bush
announced he had signed the order permitting use of military commissions. As
Bush was leaving for his Texas ranch for
a meeting with Russian President Putin,
Deputy White House Counsel Timothy
Flanigan announced "The order's signed
and nobody's ashamed of it."
Someone should be.
Elisa Massimino is director of the Washington, D.C., office of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, where she is
responsible for advancing all aspects of
the Lawyers Committee's human rights
agenda in Washington, D.C.
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the Center for Constitutional Rights, and
legal affairs correspondent for The
Nation. Portions of this article are
adapted from Professor Cole's testimony
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